The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European Security Policy After 911 by Raphael Bossong

Author:Raphael Bossong [Bossong, Raphael]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: General, Europe, Political Science, History, Terrorism, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780415688574
Google: WNqjWjB12kkC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-01-15T09:06:52+00:00

Input from EU institutions

In contrast to the aftermath of Madrid, the EU Council Secretariat could not draw on available documents and proposals in summer 2005. The UK Presidency was also much less reliant on the Council Secretariat than Belgium or Ireland when it came to managing the EU's crisis response and political machinery. Thus the Secretariat would mostly revert to a more conventional role as institutional memory. It helped to draft the post-London declaration as well as subsequent follow-up documents (Council 19/07/2005), but one leaving an independent mark.

Meanwhile, it took two weeks before the Commission presented a small package of only four measures that was sold as a response to the London bombings (Commission 21/09/2005a): a proposal for a First Pillar directive on data retention, the signing of the Council of Europe's convention on money laundering and terrorism financing, a Commission communication on radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, and a financial decision to use €7 million for pilot projects in the areas of ‘prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks’.

With the exception of the first proposal that will be discussed below, this was not ground-breaking. A Commission Communication on radicalisation (Commission 21/09/2005b) had been expected ever since autumn 2004 when the objective became included in The Hague discussion process. This will be addressed further below. A limited fund of €7 million for additional research on terrorism policies equally had been long foreseen for the new financial perspective for 2007 to 2013 (Commission 06/04/2005) and paled in comparison with the efforts of the main member states. Finally, support for the CoE convention on money laundering reflected the EU's default policy to comply with all relevant international law provisions in these areas.

The Commission's stance on the retention of telecommunications data was all the more significant. As mentioned above, the UK pushed for a quick agreement on the existing proposal for a decision under the framework of Justice and Home Affairs (Third Pillar). However, the Commission stuck to its idea for a Common Market (First Pillar) directive that it had worked on since spring 2004. This amounted to an open confrontation with the Council, as a First Pillar directive would require the full participation of the European Parliament and would have to be based on data protection legislation for commercial actors. The stakes were raised further after the UK failed to obtain agreement on its proposal at the informal JHA Council on 8 September, since various national interest groups underlined their opposition (BBC News 08/09/2005; Euractiv.com 09/09/2005).6 Only the day before, UK Home Secretary Clarke had gone before the European Parliament to defend his position (Clarke 07/09/2005), buttressed by an extensive report (UK Presidency 07/09/2005).7 Nevertheless, the Commission went ahead with its proposal for a directive (European Report 07/09/2005). It would take a major political effort to overcome this confrontation by the end of 2005. Suffice it to state here that the EU's limited reaction to the London bombings was accentuated by a lack of adequate policy inputs by the member states and

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